Introduction
Lay participation in the administration of justice in Ireland is based on a transplant of the English jury of twelve local laymen selected to make a decision on the facts in a civil or a criminal case. Of course, such over-simplification obscures the various intricacies of the nineteenth-century jury system, which had evolved over time into an extremely complex set of rules, procedures and practices. To start with, there were various categories of jury. The grand jury determined whether there was sufficient evidence for a criminal prosecution to run; the trial jury (or petty jury) decided on the guilt or innocence of the defendant in criminal cases, or settled a dispute between parties in a civil action; an inquest or coroner's jury determined how death had occurred in cases that appeared suspicious. Trial juries could be common or special: the former tried the vast bulk of civil and criminal cases, while the latter were considered to have more specialised expertise, and were  Dr Niamh Howlin is a lecturer at the Sutherland School of Law, University College Dublin, Ireland. mainly used in complex commercial civil actions. 1 Distinctions were sometimes drawn between jurors deciding civil cases and those deciding criminal cases. 2 There were also various specific categories of jury which carried out specific functions, such as the mixed jury de medietate linguae, 3 the jury of matrons 4 and the market jury. 5 selected rather than elected, and jury service was neither hereditary, nor associated with high status or the possibility of consequential election to other offices. 10 Although widening the jury franchise was the aim of many nineteenth-century reformers, jury duty itself was actually perceived as irksome, and those who were qualified to undertake it tried strenuously to avoid it.
II. Law, Politics and Justice in Nineteenth-Century Ireland
At the dawn of the nineteenth century, legislation established the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. 11 Ireland lost its parliament, and Irish representatives henceforth served in the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland at Westminster. 12 This had an immense impact on law and justice, and one effect was 'the exposure of the inadequacies of Ireland's law and legal system to the scrutiny of the United Kingdom parliament'. 13 The Union ensured that Ireland shared in 'the new climate of law reform that was to obtain at Westminster, and the legislative triumphs of Benthamite utilitarianism were to be substantially paralleled in Ireland.' 14 This was a positive development, and as Osborough points out, even if some changes fell somewhat short of the ideal, 'Ireland was the beneficiary of a huge amount of progressive legislation'. 15 As the century progressed, there was a 'rationalisation of the machinery of justice' in the United Kingdom. The reform, simplification and standardization of practice and procedure 16 was led by such advocates of codification and law reform as Robert Peel and Henry Brougham. 17 While some reforms had universal application, others related exclusively to Ireland, with the result that criminal and civil law were administered 10 Unlike, for example, the 21 and were supported by a centralised, professional police force, the Royal Irish Constabulary. 22 Ireland also had public prosecutors before England, partially in response to the difficulty in finding private individuals willing to prosecute in cases of a political or agrarian character. 23 The Union with Great Britain was never the seamless convergence of people and politics so optimistically envisaged in the late eighteenth century. 24 Ireland, or 'the Irish question' was a divisive political issue in Britain for much of the nineteenth century. In the first half of the century, the Repeal movement, the Great Famine of the 1840s, and large-scale Irish emigration to Great Britain 'caused widespread consternation and curiosity among the British', 25 and Irish affairs dominated British public discourse in the mid-century. 26 In particular, the Great Famine can be seen as marking a 'profound transformation in fundamental challenge to the authority of the state. 46 Governments tended to respond by prioritising the suppression of disorder. For example, draconian legislation was introduced in response to such difficulties, suspending trial by jury in disturbed districts; imposing a curfew and appointing a specialised police force to maintain law and order in disturbed areas; 47 and allowing violent agrarian to be tried in Dublin, away from disturbed areas, in contravention of the common law principle that jury trials were to take place in the locality of alleged offences. 48 Further legislation provided for summary trial before two magistrates, or trial by special jury. 49
III. The Jury at the Interface of Law, Politics and Religion
De Tocqueville wrote in 1838 that the real strength of the jury lay in its political power. , and he viewed is both a judicial and a political institution. 50 As was the case elsewhere in Europe and in the common-law world, the jury in Ireland became a focal point for reform agitation on a number of occasions during the nineteenth century by Liberals, Nationalists, Catholics and others. British and Irish Liberals increasingly found that their cause aligned to that of the Catholics, and jury reform was part of that agenda. 51 Religion had a unique place in Irish public life and political discourse, and it has been observed that Irish Catholics still could not sit in parliament, were excluded from the majority of senior administrative posts, and could not serve as judges, king's counsel or sheriffs. 55 As Cullen notes, 'the surviving corpus of discriminatory law after 1793 was still large'. 56 Furthermore, there were various insidious practices which indirectly impacted on Catholic civil liberties. For example, they complained that they were routinely excluded from offices for which they were now theoretically eligible. 57 This is borne out in statistics compiled by the Catholic Association in 1828, which demonstrate that 'of 1,314 offices connected with the administration of justice to which Catholics could legally be appointed, only 39 were in fact held by Catholics.' 58 Similarly, Catholics were regularly prevented from sitting on juries, although they were never entirely barred from serving. 59 As Connolly points out, 'the formal exclusion of Catholics from the highest levels of administration and the legal profession was ... part of a much wider set of grievances. 60 Discontent at this state of affairs led to the emergence of the Catholic Emancipation movement, which coincided with a general religious revival among all denominations, and a growing anti-Protestant sentiment among Catholics. The 1820s saw an upsurge in sectarian agrarian disturbances, and Connolly points out that 'the forces being employed to suppress the agrarian disturbances of this period -the police, the army, and the yeomanry -were all seen by large sections of the population as essentially protestant bodies.' 61 Elite members of Catholic society such as lawyers, and later merchants and journalists, ensured that the emancipation movement gained mass support and momentum in both Ireland and Britain. Under the charismatic leadership of lawyer Daniel O'Connell, 'the new militant rhetoric demanded rights, rather than concessions; the language was, in a real sense, democratic.' 62 This was a new style of popular politics, and Connolly describes the Catholic leaders as adopting 'the characteristic stance of bourgeois politicians throughout early nineteenth-century Europe, seeking to use popular discontent to further their own political aims, while at the same time holding back from the point at which that discontent would Even if a Catholic was summoned as a juror, he still was not guaranteed to actually try a case. Much antipathy among Catholics and nationalists focused on what was known as the 'stand aside' procedure, something which was apparently used much more in Ireland than in England. 74 . This allowed the Crown Solicitor to order any juror -who was duly qualified, had been summoned and attended the court -to stand aside during the selection process.
No reason had to be given for this. In theory the juror was being asked to stand aside temporarily, while the list of jurors was being called out. If the list had to be called out a second time, due to an insufficient number of jurors attending, the jurors who had been asked to stand aside would then be duly sworn. In practice, however, the list was almost never called out a second time, so those jurors were effectively prevented from sitting on the jury. The 'stand aside' power was supposed to parallel defendants' rights to challenge jurors with or without cause, but in reality the Crown's right was much greater because there was no limit on the number of jurors who could be discarded in this way. In the first half of the nineteenth century there were allegations that jurors were being set aside on purely religious grounds. For example, Daniel O'Connell told a parliamentary committee in 1825 that in county Cork, police magistrates had been observed 'setting aside the Catholic jurors, and endeavouring to pick out, as much as possible, a Protestant jury' until he objected. 75 Later in the century, the focus of the debate shifted away from exclusion on religious grounds, towards exclusion on political grounds, but often in Ireland the two were interchangeable. Although this 'monstrous and un-English power of selecting a jury' 76 was sharply criticized in Ireland, it is likely that over-use of the stand-aside procedure was exceptional. 72 
Report of the Select Committee of House of Lords on Operation of Irish Jury Laws as Regards Trials by Jury in
Criminal Cases (HL 1881, 430 -XI), 1, per Purcell, para 24. Another, Buchanan, suggested (para 354-5) that Catholics 'could scarcely be persuaded that the sheriff, having the right of selection and differing from them in religion and politics, did not exercise the right of selection'. English sheriffs also came in for criticism -for example, Oldham notes that there were frequent allegations that sheriffs abused special jury lists: 'Accusations of jury packing were not new in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but they grew in quantity and vehemence in the context of the special jury.' James Oldham, As discussed earlier, overtly political or agrarian cases were considered difficult to prosecute in some parts of the country. One contemporary commentator observed in 1859 that '[i]n many parts of Ireland, it is next to impossible to get a conviction of the assassins who execute the dark and bloody decrees of [secret agrarian societies].' 77 In 1832 it was claimed that the Attorney General for Ireland had declined to go ahead with certain prosecutions because there was so little hope of securing convictions. 78 The instances of controversy and high-profile debate over religious and political representation on juries are too numerous to discuss fully here, but a number of instances serve to illustrate the nature and extent of the problem. For example, the prosecutions of the leaders of a failed uprising in 1848 were mired in controversy over the representation of Catholics on the juries. One of the defendants, Thomas Meagher, asked to see a copy of the jury panel in advance of his trial, in order to make more informed challenges. In England this would be a matter of right, whilst in Ireland it was a matter of discretion; his request was denied.
When it came to the trial of another nationalist leader, William Smith O'Brien, this distinction between English and Irish practice was criticised, and the defendant sought to have his trial postponed until the jury lists were delivered. Again, this was denied. Of 288 jurors called for his trial, around 18 were Catholic. 79 At another of these trials, 80 there had been 122 Protestants and 28 Catholics on the panel, 81 with the Catholics' names were at the end of the panel, so that they were unlikely to be called. In the aftermath of these trials, a petition, entitled 'No Jury Packing', was signed by several thousand Catholics. It was addressed as A Memorial … from the Catholic Bishops, Clergy and Laity, to remonstrate against the continuance of the practice of excluding Roman Catholics from the Jury-box, and thus virtually depriving them of the advantages of the Emancipation Act, and the benefits of the Constitution. 82 The petition claimed that the practice of excluding Catholics from juries was 'one of the worst instruments of the worst days of oppression' and explained how it had come about that there were no Catholics empanelled for these trials:
1 st . The panels were so constructed by the Sheriff, as to contain a disproportionately small number of Roman Catholics, and this small number Although these trials (and others) 84 were undoubtedly rigged, this was not a universal experience -even the language of the petition suggests that the over-use of challenges by the crown was 'unusual and arbitrary'. One 1881 commentator suggested that the perception that religious interests overrode all other considerations in the jury box may have been slightly skewed, and that 'people, as a rule, somehow have an idea that religion will interfere … they think people of a different religion will have different views of those of the class that are tried, or against whom the charge is made.' 85 Cases where Catholics were dramatically under-represented were 'naturally much publicised,' 86 and exaggerations in the media were common. For example, newspaper reports of an 1829 murder trial claimed that the Crown had used its right of challenge to object to every Roman Catholic on the panel, but it emerged that there were in fact three jurors sworn onto the jury, while ten had been challenged by the defendants, and not set aside by the crown. 87 The low esteem in which the Irish jury was held in the early decades of the nineteenth century was reflected in one parliamentarian's claim that 'in a case on which religious animosities prevailed, he would infinitely rather trust the life of a man to one of the judges of the land than to an Irish jury.' 88 However, the extent to which the exclusion of Catholics from civil and criminal juries impacted upon fairness is difficult to measure. One can of course point to some extreme cases where the verdict was blatantly unfair, such as the 83 See further the claims by Mr W Fagan, MP, that 'on a late occasion out of a list on the jury book of 2,900 Catholics, and 1,600 Protestants, the sheriff selected a panel of 177, of whom there were not more than twenty-five Catholics, after deducting those who were dead, or could not attend, or were otherwise objectionable; and of these twenty-five, nineteen were placed amongst the last sixty names, and therefore, had no chance of being on the jury, who were to try a Roman Catholic for a political offence.' HC Deb 05 February 1849, vol 102 cols 284-5. 84 Another example was the controversy the so-called Sligo Trials of 1887, which involved the trials of dozens of Catholic tenant farmers who refused to pay their rent. Despite being a predominantly Catholic county, the jury panels had a large Protestant majority, and some were exclusively Protestant. These are discussed in detail in Counsel, Jury Packing. 1811 case of R v Hall. The defendant, who was a Protestant and an Orangeman, was charged with breaking and entering a Catholic chapel and stealing vestments, and indeed he admitted his guilt to the provost. Nevertheless, the jury of twelve Protestants controversially returned a verdict of not guilty. 89 Another case involved the offence of administering of an unlawful oath in support of a secret society. The Catholic defendant was tried by a jury consisting of 'five Orangemen and seven liberal Protestants,' who returned a guilty verdict without even leaving the jury box. 90 However, there were also instances where cases with a religious or a political element were, perhaps against the odds, not decided merely on that basis -for example, the 1855 trial of a Catholic priest for burning a Protestant bible. 91 There are even instances of attempts being made at the highest levels to ensure religious balance on juries -for example in 1870 the Solicitor General went to great lengths to secure a jury in county Meath which consisted of six Catholics and six Protestants. 92 Controversy in relation to many high-profile criminal trials of prominent public figures or politicians tended to crystallize around the juries tasked with trying such cases. In some instances, the procedures and abuses which led to non-representation or low representation of certain groups were brought to the fore. For example, when Daniel O'Connell, the leader of the Catholic Emancipation movement, was tried for conspiracy in 1844, Roman Catholics were significantly under-represented on his jury, and the perception was that the jury was rigged against him. This was an extremely high-profile and controversial trial for many reasons, but it was the composition of the jury and allegations of fraud and bias which received the most attention from the public, the media and politicians. 93 
IV. Widening (and Contracting) the Jury Franchise
Liberal Prime Minister Gladstone's mission was 'to pacify Ireland', and he had used the 'Irish question' to unite the Liberal party. 94 His appointment of Thomas O'Hagan, as the first Catholic Lord Chancellor of Ireland since 1688 95 was viewed as 'a gracious act to the Catholics of Ireland'. 96 O'Hagan was a committed reformer and was 'motivated by a desire to help end Catholic disabilities,' 97 including those relating to jury trials. He sought to widen the jury franchise to make the system more streamlined and efficient. Speaking in the House of Lords, he noted the various social and economic changes that had 'revolutionized the different classes of Ireland,' and pointed out that 'the old qualification of freeholders and leaseholders had become so obsolete that there were none who could now constitute a jury in Ireland. 98 His 1871 Act 99 brought in a rating qualification, significantly widening the jury franchise to include more men from the lower socio-economic classes 100 -which in practice meant more small farmers and more Roman Catholics. 101
These reforms were unfortunately ill-timed, as they were soon followed by major shift in the political landscape. A widespread violent agitation known as the Land War swept much of the countryside, resulting in significant challenges for the administration of justice. The difficulties in securing convictions in agrarian-related cases were exacerbated by the altered composition of local trial juries. 102 Many of the newly-enfranchised jurors were from the same socio-political class and religious denomination as defendants, and through a mixture of empathy and intimidation were reluctant to convict. 103 As a consequence of these difficulties, the authorities resorted to various means to try to secure convictions in politically-sensitive cases. One way of doing this was to have the venue for a criminal trial moved away from the locality where the alleged offence had taken place, to a different county with a different jury. At common law the general rule was that the trial of any crime should take place in the county where the alleged crime had been committed, 105 but in certain circumstances a case could be tried at a superior court in Dublin, or in a different county. Until the 1880s it was quite difficult to secure a change of venue, but the Criminal Law and Procedure (Ireland) Act 1887 106 made it easier for the Attorney General to change the venue of a criminal trial where he was of the view that a fair and impartial trial could not be had in the original county. Cases were most commonly moved from the West and South, where the agitation as strongest, to Dublin. It was believed that city juries had less sympathy with the agrarian agitation, and were less likely to be under the influence of violent or threatening secret societies. The same legislation also provided for the trial of certain offences by special juries. Men from a higher socioeconomic background, they were considered to have less in common with those involved in the agrarian agitation, and to be more likely to convict. This was essentially a means of circumventing O'Hagan's liberal reforms, and ensuring that certain cases continued to be in the hands of an elite. Even more extreme were the provisions allowing for suspension of trial by jury in proclaimed districts, to be replaced by trials before panels of judges. The legislation was controversial, eliciting mixed reactions from parliamentarians, judges, lawyers and other commentators.
V. Common Themes
Problems and controversies with the Irish jury system were often reflective of wider social, economic and political issues forming part of the 'Irish question'. One indication of the politicisation of jury trials in Ireland is the frequency with which the jury system was the the same reluctance to convict for political crimes, and also tended to acquite in cases involving pornography and criminal defamation: see Taylor 113 and motivated by perverse logic. 114 The interplay between juries and politics in nineteenthcentury Europe is a topic which merits further scholarship. A full comparative analysis of nineteenth-century jury systems is beyond the scope of this article and it is not proposed to consider every theme which had parallels in other systems. 115 However, there are some universal themes emerging from an analysis of the politics of jury trials in Ireland, several of which are worth mentioning here.
The first is the issue of representativeness. Whenever there is lay involvement in the administration of justice, the issue of representativeness inevitably crops up. Who are the laypersons selected to represent the multitudes? The answer is always a product of both time and place: nineteenth-century conceptions of representativeness meant that gender representation was a non-issue, and a distinction was drawn between 'worthy' and 'unworthy' candidates. This was variously done through property, status, residence, or occupational requirements. 116 In Ireland, a combination of rules and abuses often resulted in under-representation or non-representation of particular groups. Agitation for and debate surrounding greater representativeness on Irish juries can be divided into three periods. In the first, from the 1820s to 30s, religious representativeness (as between Catholics and Protestants) was the most urgent issue. In the 1870s and 80s, religion was less of a factor than political representativeness (as between nationalists or Home Rulers and unionists, broadly speaking). And, somewhat overlapping with this, from the 1860s to 1880s there was a move towards greater social representativeness, with liberal reformers seeking to widen the jury franchise so as to include more men from lower socio-economic backgrounds. 117 This was in many ways less urgent than the other two, but in achieving greater social representativeness, O'Hagan indirectly improved religious and political representativeness too. In Ireland, as in France and elsewhere, the democratization of the jury was criticised by some as allowing men who were unsuitable and incompetent to sit on juries. 118 In the late nineteenth century, 'new' jurors were deemed to be ignorant, uneducated and ill-equipped to handle increasingly complex evidence presented at trials. 119 While representativeness is one of the universal anchors for lay participation systems, it is clearly a fluid notion, evolving with social, economic and political realities. Nineteenth-century perceptions of representativeness were much narrower than those of the twenty-first century. 120 Even as agitators for reform sought more representative juries, they still operated within a narrow interpretation of 'representativeness', bound by gender, class, education, health, physical ability, property and so on.
The second theme flowing from this is the State's tendency to restrict or limit jury trial in times of turmoil. This was a frequent feature of the British administration's efforts to deal effectively with the 'Irish question'. For example, witness Robert Peel's early nineteenth century legislation which sought to restrict jury trial. Another example from early in the century was the legislative response to the violent opposition to the payment of tithes by Roman Catholics to the Anglican Church of Ireland in the 1830s. 121 Known as the Tithe War, it was characterised by interpersonal violence, damage to property (including livestock) and the effective use of threats. There was widespread intimidation of both witnesses and jurors in prosecutions connected with the agitation, 122 posing a serious challenge to the effective administration of justice. 123 Legislation was passed 124 to allow for the transfer to other counties of trials relating to the agitation. Similarly, in the 1880s during the Land War, legislation was introduced which allowed certain cases to be tried in different counties, provided for trials by three-judge panels instead of juries, and also allowed certain criminal cases to be tried by special juries. Other jurisdictions, for example Austria and Belgium, have also seen limitations being imposed on civil and criminal jury trials, in response to changing political landscapes. 125 In the British Empire, restrictions were placed on juries to ensure their continued function, albeit in a more limited incarnation -special juries in criminal cases, 126 smaller juries 127 and changes to the rules on jury challenges, 128 for example.
professionalization of the English legal professions, with an emphasis on 'education, expertise, and skill, in contrast to the amateurism of jurors.' 132 This was one factor contributing to emergence of juryless courts in mid-nineteenth century England. Similarly, Brown Blake writes that '[l]ike many people in the common-law world, Nova Scotians increasingly found juries anachronistic at a time when contemporary thought emphasized that the justice system should be efficient, rational and consistent.' 133 Lay participation purports to lend an air of legitimacy to legal systems, but increasingly, the jury was being viewed less as a necessary check on arbitrary power, and more as an important symbol of participation.
Members of the judiciary and the administration lamented the shift in power which had resulted from the perceived over-liberalisation of the jury franchise, and, as discussed, this in turn led to the passing of legislation designed to disempower petty juries. Judges may have been irked or frustrated by the manner in which juries fulfilled their functions, but they nevertheless supported the institution of the jury in principle. They appreciated the important symbolic and inclusive role played by the jury in securing popular support for the state and its laws. 134 Although liberal politics cannot be credited with a 'rise' in juries in nineteenth-century Ireland (juries were already a well-established aspect of the Irish justice system), the preoccupation of British Liberals with the 'Irish question' undoubtedly led to improvements in the jury system. This was rooted in Benthamite conceptions of the role of the State: greater acceptance of the legitimacy of the State and its organs would ultimately lead to economic development, and such legitimacy was to be achieved by addressing issues such as representativeness and state bias. In a practical sense, this meant reforming and popularising aspects of the administration of justice, especially the jury. However, the liberalisation of the jury had unforeseen consequences. Defending his much-criticised Juries Act, O'Hagan pointed out that it had 'opened the jury box to classes who had for generations been jealously precluded from any interference with the Courts of Justice. It took away the mischievous discretion with which official persons had been accustomed, sometimes capriciously, and sometimes corruptly, to manipulate the panels at their good pleasure, and put an end, for ever, to the notorious packing which so often made trial by jury a scandal and a farce.' 135 Unique political realities notwithstanding, there is a certain universality about lay participation in justice systems. Arguments both for and against juries have been substantially similar, in different countries and at different times, and many legal and political difficulties encountered in Ireland were replicated elsewhere. There is also a universality to the factors which affected the rise in popularity of the jury, and more recently, its decline in many Western systems, are also universal. 136
